Fly in the ointment. A spoonful of honey in a barrel of tar. See what "fly in the ointment" is in other dictionaries

A fly in the ointment A gullible reader is probably rubbing his hands: "These are the cunning swindlers, these Latsy!" I am afraid, however, that not everything in the history of DeFeo and their home is so simple. Rather, the opposite is true. If George and Katie Lutz figured it out, why no neighbors heard the shots

What did he say German Oskarovich? And he said this: “We lost the competition and ended up in the camp of the countries that are losing” (details about the Gaidar Forum). The State Duma considered this statement scandalous and demanded that the head of Sberbank be dismissed. Meanwhile, apart from the sharpness of the wording, there is nothing new in the words of G. Gref. Judgments that the country is losing the pace of development, losing in competition and sinking to the level of a regional power have been voiced earlier by respected economists and politicians. Why were the words of G. Gref taken so painfully? There are several reasons.

First, they were said at the forum, whose opinions are taken very seriously not only in our country, but also in the West. Secondly, the words of G. Gref sounded like a serious contrast (almost a challenge) to those judgments that he expressed at the same forum head of government D. Medvedev... And this is "a scandal in a noble family." And finally, thirdly, G. Gref aggravated the diagnosis of the disease at the very moment when, according to all the canons of politics, it should have been mitigated. Russia is entering the electoral period. In 2016, parliamentary elections are coming, and in 2018, presidential elections. It would seem that it's time to "paint with oil", and not chop with a chisel on granite.

So who is German Oskarovich? Russian patriot? Or five minutes to the "fifth column"?

Photo: AiF / Andrey Dorofeev

Russian Cossack

I think that it is difficult to answer this question without understanding the concept of "Russian patriotism". Especially today, when the demonstration of ostentatious patriotism has become almost a national game and sometimes takes on very dubious forms. In some places (so far, fortunately, in the dark corners of Russia, namely in Komi), officials in an effort to please the authorities have already tried to burn books that, in their opinion, “form a distorted perception of history in the youth environment and popularize alien installation ideology ". In Omsk, local Cossack women who declared themselves patriots staged an attraction with archery at stands with images Obamaand Poroshenko... And what type of patriotism can be attributed to the already familiar advertising inscriptions on our taxis and private cars “Forward to Berlin!”, “Armor is strong and our tanks are fast”? Recently, this kind of posters have begun to appear on government buses and trolleybuses. It is interesting how such patriotic impulses assess German tourists coming to Moscow?

There is no need to say: Russians for the most part are committed to a sense of patriotism, and they do not need obsessive prompts. But the problem is that people do not always understand what it is - real, civilized patriotism. Patriotic feelings sometimes manifest themselves in a very extravagant form. Especially in the outback, where the level of political culture (and just culture) is not too high. Indeed, for many, being a patriot means extolling everything that is theirs and spitting on everything that is alien. Especially American. The regional press is full of descriptions of the most absurd situations. In the village of Brekhovskaya, Yaroslavl Region, one of the residents (of course, due to drunkenness) beat a neighbor to death, suspecting him that he was working for American intelligence.

Facets of patriotism

Many Russians do not realize that patriotism is only real when it manifests itself not in the form of blasphemy against “enemies of the people”, but in a creative, labor form. Patriotism is strengthened not when poems are written about it or lectures “about the national pride of the Great Russians” are read, but when people see from their windows how their lives are improving, the life of their streets, how the country is getting stronger, new factories are opening, good roads and houses are being built. When the population grows, and new places appear in kindergartens and schools.

Today, polemicizing about patriotism in the USSR and the Russian Federation, it is often said that Soviet patriotism was artificially implanted by Stalin's propaganda. Yes, the propaganda pressure was really serious. The country woke up with a hymn, went to sleep with "Wide is my native country", and in between there were reports of success. But StalinBeing a pragmatist, he understood that one cannot raise people's enthusiasm by parades and reports on success. After all, the victorious soldiers who returned from Europe to Russia heard not only songs. They saw devastated cities and villages, deserted fields, destroyed factories, thousands of orphans, beggars and inconsolable widows-soldiers. And, probably, it is no coincidence that after holding a grandiose Victory Parade on Red Square in 1945, Stalin canceled all parades the very next year. They were renewed only 20 years later. It was a strict message to the bureaucracy, the military, and the people: stop marching, it's time to build, it's time to plow. Indeed, the post-war stage of accelerated restoration of the national economy has become a real driver of the country's development and popular enthusiasm.

Unfortunately, the pretentious interpretations of patriotism are, in essence, historical in nature. The practice of concealing problems and protruding "unprecedented successes" reached a special flourishing in Russia with Nicolae I. Textbook is the statement of the main Nikolaev "silovik" count Benckendorff: “Russia's past is amazing, its present is more than magnificent; as for the future, it is above everything that the boldest imagination can paint. " Alas, the unrestrained conservative interpretation of the state of the country led to disaster. The development of Russia was so slowed down that the army was not adapted to modern warfare. Russia faced defeat in the Crimean campaign. The king, who considered himself a patriot and, in fact, was such, did not suffer defeat. His death (from a cold) was sudden. According to some testimonies, Nicholas I committed suicide.

Unfortunately, the traditions of pretentious patriotism do not die out. The substitution of bragging rights for business remains a favorite game of the bureaucracy and a career driver. Whoever shouts “Hurray!” Louder is already a patriot even in his new position. Meanwhile, a spoonful of bitter tar in a barrel of sweet oil would be very useful. I would put a monument to German Gref ...

) - about a small, insignificant addition that spoils the big and good (Big Dictionary of Russian Sayings, V.M. Mokienko, T.G. Nikitina, 2007)

A fly in the ointment in a barrel with honey - a saying about something small that can poison, spoil the big, good. (Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language (1992), N. Yu. Shvedova, "Tar")

Tar - a resinous and burnt liquid expelled from birch bark by fire ((1863-1866), by the word "Tar").

If you add just a spoonful of fly in the ointment to a barrel of honey, you can spoil the taste of the whole barrel of honey. Hence the proverb.

This Russian proverb is indicated in the book "" (1853):

A barrel of honey, a spoonful of tar - will ruin everything (section - "")

A spoonful of honey, a barrel of tar (i.e. interleaving) (section - "")

It should be noted that in Russia tar was a symbol of dirt and impurity. For example, in Russia, right up to the 1917 revolution, neighbors smeared tar on the gate (door, porch) of the house where the girl who had sexual intercourse before marriage lived (see)

Examples of

(1948 - 2017)

"Vodka is not a Russian product!" (2016):

"But suddenly at the end, unexpectedly, first of all, for me, it turned out that the authors and editors of the program prepared a barrel of tar on a spoonful of honey... We tried very convincingly to prove that the Slavs, despite their much deeper past than it is commonly believed, still have nothing of their own: the Kremlin was built by Italians, vodka was brought in, nesting dolls - from the Japanese, dumplings - from the Chinese ... and so on and so forth. ... "

(1925 - 1991), (1933 - 2012)

"A beetle in an anthill" (1979):

“Everything seems to be going the way it should go, and at the same time, some trifle, some sheer trifle spoils the whole picture. drop of tar…"

(1860 - 1904)

"The review is excellent, but Mr. Burenin shouldn't pour a barrel of tar into a spoonful of honey, that is, while praising me, laugh at the dead Nadson. "

P. P. Karatygin

"Temporary workers and favorites of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries", Book one, 1870:

"Truths are certain; but does the scent of a rose reward for the scratches caused by its thorns, and a fly in the ointment in a barrel of honey does not destroy all its sweetness?"

(1801 - 1872)

"Petersburg janitor" - about the janitor Grigory:

"... will deliver a barrel of tar, another honey - according to the proverb, they live together, a dozen belt whips, hewn arches, shafts, bast shoes, gingerbread, ribbons and several bundles of lambs. That's all the supplies and all the trade; "

During the Battle of the Atlantic, German submariners have repeatedly proved their best qualities by deeds: bravery, high fighting spirit and professionalism. However, as the proverb rightly says, a fly in the ointment spoils a barrel of honey, and the German submarine was no exception. If Prien, Kretschmer, Lut and others were the "honey" in it, then the "fly in the ointment" was a close friend of Admiral Dönitz, the corvette captain Hugo Foerster, who became a reason for the shame of the German submariners.

Hugo Förster was born on January 21, 1905 in the Hessian town of Bad Wildungen. In April 1923, he linked his life with the navy, coming to serve in the Reichsmarine. Details of the beginning of his career as a naval sailor are not abundant. It is only known that on April 1, 1925, he became Fenrich Zur See, two years later - Ober Fenrich, and on October 1, 1927 he received the epaulettes of Lieutenant Zur See. It is not known how his service developed further, but the fact that Foerster, nine years later in the rank of lieutenant commander, commanded the destroyer "Tiger", speaks of his successful promotion up the career ladder.

In 1937-1938 he served in Berlin, in the War Office. Where Förster was at the start of the war is unknown, but on January 1, 1940, he was appointed navigator for the new heavy cruiser Blücher, already a corvette captain. On it, he took part in the Wehrmacht invasion of Norway and survived the sinking of his ship in the Oslofjord on April 9, 1940. After the capture of the Norwegian capital by the Germans, Foerster served as the commandant of the port of Oslo until the end of April.

Canadian corvette "Shambly", 1941 (https://en.wikipedia.org)

In May 1940, significant changes took place in Förster's career: he went to serve in the submarine. This was probably due to the fact that after the Norwegian campaign in the ranks of the Kriegsmarine there were not so many surface ships left, and the positions on them were already taken. Over the next year, he studied at the Scuba Diving School and completed a submarine commander's course. It is not known whether Foerster had an internship on a combat boat, but at the beginning of 1941 he was appointed commander of the U 501 being completed, which was commissioned by the Kriegsmarine on April 30.

This submarine belonged to the IXC series, which differed from its predecessors "nines" by a slightly larger displacement and a different arrangement of fuel tanks. The latter made it possible to raise the fuel reserve by 43 tons, which automatically increased the range.

Commander and crew

After completion of acceptance tests, U 501 left Hamburg for Kiel, and then returned to the Baltic to train the crew and test the functionality of the boat as a whole. I must say that Förster was not very lucky with the crew: the majority of the U 501 crew consisted of sailors who had no experience of service on submarines, and the youngest of them was only 17 years old. The exception was the boat's mechanical engineer, four foremen and several privates with combat experience.

A similar problem with personnel arose due to the increase in the number of submarines being commissioned. Germany began the war with 57 boats, and for two years the number of its submarine forces only decreased, but at the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942. the number of submarines rose sharply after the completion of hundreds of boats, laid down in 1938-1939. This led to the need to increase the number of submariners to form new crews, which affected the quality of selection for submariners - it began to differ from the pre-war time for the worse.

The main battery gun of the Canadian corvette "Moose Joe" (http://www.forposterityssake.ca)

If the U 501 commander was unlucky with the crew, the crew was also unlucky with the commander. Förster not only lacked experience in commanding a boat, but also lacked the necessary qualities for this. As a result, he did not enjoy the authority of his people, who despised him for his inexperience, cowardice and posturing. Although Förster did not belong to the hereditary officer class, he managed to acquire a certain polish, but we can say that his inferiority complex eventually led to a kind of psychological compensation, which resulted in the repulsive habit of poking everyone in the face with his rank, demanding strict respect and various privileges ... It is curious that at the same time, according to the recollections of eyewitnesses, Foerster was closely acquainted with Dönitz.

It is obvious that the commander of U 501 was a careerist, and his attitude towards the Nazi regime stemmed not so much from ideological or patriotic considerations as from the realization of the benefits that could be derived from such a state of affairs. This did not prevent him from conducting frequent pathetic lectures for the crew on duty and death, in which he often repeated his favorite saying: "The Germans know how to die." But the submariners did not really believe their commander, believing that in a combat situation his words would be at odds with their deeds. As a result, the morale of the boat crew was so low that even the officers were not eager to fight. All this could not but affect the actions of U 501 already in its first campaign, which predictably ended in disaster.

On the first trip

After the end of the tests, the U 501 returned to the shipyard in Hamburg to eliminate the identified defects, then moved to Kiel, from where on July 2, 1941, went to Norway. A day later, the boat arrived in Horten, where it stayed for 10 days, after which it made the transition to Trondheim, arriving there on July 15 and delaying three weeks for the necessary repairs and the last training in torpedo shooting and training dives.

Hydroacoustician of the corvette "Shambly" Sergeant Major J. Bane, who discovered U 501 underwater (Imperial War Museums)

On 7 August, U 501 sailed again and headed for the Atlantic to reach the area south of Iceland. As the American historian Clay Blair wrote in his work, by this moment all boats in the sea were deployed by Dönitz into three groups: North near Iceland, Central between Scotland and Ireland, South in the Gibraltar region. U 501 went to join the Northern Group, which caused the greatest concern to the British Admiralty: it posed a real threat to the battleship Prince of Wales (HMS Prince of Wales), on which Winston Churchill made a voyage to Newfoundland in Argentia to meet with Roosevelt.

On August 11, Förster, who was en route to Iceland, reported to headquarters about contact with a large convoy - it was ON-5, which left Liverpool on August 6 and was guarded by ships and escort aircraft. On the same day, U 501 was attacked by a British ship: depth charges, which were probably dropped by the corvette "Snowdrop" (HMS Snowdrop), did not cause any damage to the boat. Since after that the pursuit of the convoy was stopped by her, and there were no other boats nearby, Dönitz considered any action against ON-5 futile.

Thereafter, U 501 was included in the Grönland submarine group operating on the section of the convoy route between Greenland and Iceland. By the way, the group did not achieve any significant success: for 17 days of its existence, the boats managed to sink only a few ships and the corvette "Pikoti" (HMS Picotee). One of the main reasons for the failure was the reading of German radio messages by British codebreakers following the capture of the Enigma code tables on U 110 in May 1941. Looking at the maps of the enemy, the British conducted their convoys bypassing the curtains of "wolf packs".

Canadian corvette "Moose Joe", 1941 (https://en.wikipedia.org)

During this time, Foerster made only one attack, firing two torpedoes under the periscope at an unknown vessel, but missed. Most of the time U 501 spent underwater, hiding from British aircraft that were actively patrolling the local waters. One day she was threatened with an attack from the air, when one of the watchmen - a young sailor hesitated on the bridge, not diving quickly into the hatch when the aircraft approached. However, the Germans got off with fright, since the pilots, apparently, did not notice the boat in time, and she managed to submerge.

Förster succeeded on September 5, 1941, when in the afternoon a lone vessel, the Norwegian steamer Einvik, was seen lagging behind the SC-41 convoy. The boat attacked him from the surface, firing six torpedoes in three volleys, of which only one hit the target. Since the torpedo steamer continued to float and began broadcasting, the boat opened fire from a cannon and, spending 30-40 shells, sent it to the bottom. The crew of the ship managed to lower the boats and escape: from one of them people were picked up by an Icelandic vessel, the other reached Iceland on its own.

"Germans know how to die"

In late August, the headquarters of the submarine forces disbanded the unsuccessful group "Grönland" and formed a new group "Markgraf" (Markgraf). Dönitz ordered the boats of the new group to take positions southeast of Greenland, outside the range of enemy aircraft from Iceland. From the moment the boats were deployed into the curtain, the British conducted eight convoys around it, but the ninth - numbered SC-42 - was discovered and attacked by the Germans on September 9. As a result of the battle that unfolded around the convoy, the submarines sank 16 ships with a total tonnage of 68,259 brt.

This is roughly how the actions of the boarding party from the Moose Joe looked like when it was picking up the crew of U 501. In reality, the photo shows a boat from the US Coast Guard ship picking up submariners from the sinking U 175 (https://en.wikipedia.org)

U 501 also entered the Margrave and was connected by the submarine headquarters to the SC-42 attack. On September 10, Foerster received a message from Dönitz with the coordinates of the convoy, after which he adjusted his course so as to bypass the enemy and take a position on his course. However, a message was soon received from one of the boats that the convoy changed its direction of movement to the east. U 501 was at that moment moving from the south and managed to cross the course of the convoy before it appeared. As a result, Foerster missed and went north, so he had to turn 180 ° and go south, after which he got into the correct position.

At this moment, the "gray wolves" already mercilessly grabbed the SC-42, inflicting losses on it. The commander of the Canadian escort group was forced to ask for urgent help. In response to his radiograms, the Admiralty sent PLO aircraft and ships to the dying convoy. At approximately 02:00 on September 11, U 501 evaded the aircraft by submersion. Half an hour later, the crew of the boat heard the operation of the sonar, but it was not possible to determine from which side, until the acoustician noticed the noise of the propellers of the approaching ships.

As the aforementioned Blair wrote, these were the ships of the first Canadian "support group" - corvettes "Shambly" (HMCS Chambly) and "Moose Joe" (HMCS Moose Jaw), which, while on a training voyage, were sent by the Admiralty to reinforce the SC escort -42. The ships went in a wake column towards the convoy. Being 4 miles ahead of him, "Chambly" established hydroacoustic contact with an underwater target and dropped four depth charges, set at depths of 30, 45 and 75 (two pieces) meters. Moose Joe immediately left the wake to the left to engage.

The explosions of depth charges caused significant damage to the U 501 located at a depth of 40 meters: many instruments broke, the stern horizontal rudders were out of order, the main and emergency lighting went out. Subsequently, the crew members of the boat unanimously stated that they heard two more blows at the control room, which was followed by the smell of gas - the water got on the potassium cartridges. The outboard valves were also allegedly damaged, and the depth gauge was out of order. But, despite this, all the Germans are sure that there was no water in the boat, except for a small amount that got through the bow latrine. Some of them believed that this was due to the destruction of the outboard pipes of the latrine itself.

U 570 after surrendering to the British Hudson of 269 Squadron RAF on 27 August 1941. The picture was taken aboard the Catalina of the 209th Royal Air Force Squadron, which flew in to replace the Hudson. Also included in the frame is a 450-pound depth charge suspended under the wing of the Catalina (Imperial War Museums)

Immediately after the explosion of the bombs from the Moose Joe, a submarine was spotted floating between it and the Shambly. Since U 501 had a move, as soon as the Shambly was out of the headmistress, Moose Joe opened fire. Unfortunately for the Canadians, after the first shot, the gun jammed, so the corvette increased its speed in order to catch up with the boat and ram it. U 501 changed course, and for some time the ships went very close, side by side. Then something happened that had never happened before in a submarine war! Here is how the report of the intelligence department of the Admiralty describes what happened:

"CommanderU 501 immediately jumped aboard the Moose Joe, and the other Germans seemed to want to follow suit. However, on "Moose Joe" were clearly not ready to repel the boarding attack, and therefore the corvette turned away from the boat. "

Then the boat seemed to try to "cut" the corvette, so the latter increased its speed to full and hit it on the starboard side at an angle of 45 °. The submarine passed under the nose of the Moose Joe, albeit much more slowly. By this time, the cannon was again put into operation on the corvette and firing was resumed. The Germans immediately started jumping overboard. According to the testimony of the rescued, their 20-mm cannon on the bridge was ready to fire when the boat surfaced, but the battle ended before it began.

From "Moose Joe" they asked for help on "Shambly" in rescuing the Germans, since almost the entire crew of the corvette was already busy lifting the submariners out of the water, and there was no one to lower the boats. “Shambly” tried to approach the side of the boat and take it on board, but nothing came of it, since the diesel engines on the boat were still working, and it was running. Therefore, "Shambly" had to send her boat with a boarding party under the command of the 1st lieutenant of the corvette.

His Majesty's Submarine "The Earl" - formerly U 570, commissioned by the Royal Navy of Great Britain (Imperial War Museums)

The Canadians managed to board the boat. According to the party report, they saw a large hole, more than a meter in diameter, at the junction of the hull and superstructure on the left shell. Also, apparently, the left aft horizontal rudder was torn off. The stay on the boat was short-lived, as U 501 was sinking quickly, and the 1st lieutenant from the Shambly, who was in the wheelhouse, was dragged under the water, but managed to get out. At approximately 03:00, the submarine sank.

Unfortunately, there were some casualties - a Canadian fireman from the boarding party died. The boat from the Shambly rescued the officer and seven lower ranks, and in total the Canadians picked up 37 people; 11 Germans were killed. U 501 became the first German submarine sunk by the Canadians in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Payback for cowardice

As it turned out later, the Germans did not plan any boarding. During interrogation, Foerster explained his premature jump from the boat in this way:

“… He supposedly had to immediately go aboard the Moose Joe in order to convey to the British the demand to save his people without fail. Otherwise, he added, the German crew could be left in the water. This explanation of his not only did not convince the British, but also drove his own people to a frenzy. "

The surviving submariners from U 501 were furious at the action of their commander. Both the officers and the lower ranks despised him for cowardice, and some threatened with physical violence if after the war he did not go to the tribunal and did not suffer just punishment. According to the crew members, Foerster not only surrendered without a fight, but later thought exclusively about saving his own skin, without taking care of either the ship or the crew. He was the first to escape from the boat, and was the only one who jumped onto a Canadian corvette, not only not having a swim before rescuing, but not even getting his feet wet.

A winner's smile: a contented sergeant-major from the corvette "Chambly" poses for a photographer with a model of a German submarine in his hands (Imperial War Museums)

The prisoners were sure that everyone who died drowned when they tried to swim to the corvettes, since the crew left the doomed, in their opinion, submarine in full force, and blamed the commander for the death of these 11 people. It got to the point that later, during a meeting with his people, Foerster gave his hand to the navigator of the boat, a man with 14 years of naval service behind him, but the latter refused his commander. During interrogation, this veteran bitterly confessed to the British that if there was another commander on the boat, she could continue the fight and had a good chance of getting away from the Canadian corvettes.

The story of Förster's captivity is similar to that of U 570 commander Hans-Joachim Rahmlow, who surrendered his boat to the British on August 27, 1941, south of Iceland. When Otto Kretschmer, who had been in captivity since March 1941, learned of this, he, as a senior officer of the camp in which the submariners were held, arranged a court of honor over the arriving officers of U 570.

Karl Doenitz after his release from Spandau together with his lawyer, military lawyer Dr. Otto Kranzbühler. The latter was Dönitz's defender at the Nuremberg trials, as well as Hugo Förster's lawyer at the military tribunal after Förster's return from captivity (Karl Doenitz and the Last Days of the Third Reich by Barry Turner)

The verdict of this court was harsh for the first watch officer, who was found guilty of conniving his commander in handing over the boat. The convict had to escape from the camp, reach U 570 and flood it. The escape was made, but the fugitive was shot. As a result, when Ramlov himself later arrived at the submariners' camp, the British, in order to avoid another victim, transferred him to another camp, where Luftwaffe officers were kept.

It is known that the same court of honor awaited Förster when he was brought to the Kretschmer camp. However, the British intervened again, who were not pleased with the prospect of the death of another prisoner officer. In addition, the commander of U 501 might not even live to see Kretschmer's trial, as his own subordinates threatened to deal with him, so Förster was quickly transferred to a camp where there were no prisoners of German submariners.

Being in captivity had a bad effect on his health. In the camp, Förster developed a nervous breakdown, and as a result, he was declared mentally ill and with the help of the International Red Cross with a party of wounded and sick German prisoners was sent to Germany. The British could not help but understand that they were sending Förster to certain death. And so it happened - upon arrival in the Reich, he was arrested and tried by a military tribunal. The ex-commander of U 501 was facing the death penalty, but he committed suicide in a prison cell on February 27, 1945. Perhaps his high-ranking friend, Grand Admiral Dönitz, intervened in his fate, who could offer Förster such mercy as suicide instead of shooting and shame.

Literature:

1. Blair C. Hitler's U-boat War. The Hunters, 1939-1942 - Random House, 1996
2. Busch R., Roll H.-J. German U-boat Commanders of World War II - Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999
3. Edwards B. Attack and Sink! The Battle of the Atlantic Summer 1941: The Battle for Convoy SC42 - New Guild, 1995
4. Sebag-Montefiore H. Enigma. The Battle for the Code - John Wiley & Sons, 2001
5. Niestlé A. German U-Boat Losses during World War II: Details of Destruction - Frontline Books, 2014
6. Rohwer J. Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two - Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999
7. Wynn K. U-Boat Operations of the Second World War. Vol.1–2 - Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998
8. http://www.uboat.net
9. http://www.uboatarchive.net
10. http://historisches-marinearchiv.de
11. http://www.convoyweb.org.uk

The actions of the Soviet fighter aircraft on June 22, 1941 cannot be called successful. Shackled at first by the prohibitions to attack the enemy, and then hit by blows at airfields, Soviet pilots acted in small groups and often died without having time to inflict any tangible damage on the enemy. But there were among the “Stalin's falcons” and those who could distinguish themselves even in these difficult conditions. The history of the air regiment, which managed to prove itself on the first day of the war precisely as a unit - the 67th IAP of the Odessa Military District, looks especially remarkable against the background of all the Red Army Air Forces.

Pre-war difficulties

The regiment commander, Major Semyon Grigorievich Ilyin, who formed and cobbled together the 67th IAP in 1939-1941, was an experienced pilot and commander. In 1941 he was 35 years old, and he was already the age for fighter aircraft. After graduating from flight school in 1933, in 1937 he fought for six months on the I-15 in Spain. The result of the "government mission" was 96 sorties, injury and two Orders of the Red Banner. In September 1939, after the end of the Lipetsk advanced training courses for command personnel, Major Ilyin was appointed commander of the 67th IAP that was being formed.

We must pay tribute to Ilyin - he was a purposeful person. Despite the serious difficulties associated with the late rearmament on the I-16 (until May 1940, the regiment operated the I-15bis) and relocation from Rzhev to Moldova to an unequipped air hub, he managed to put together a part. Together with experienced squadron commanders and their deputies, Ilyin instilled in most pilots the skills necessary in combat conditions.

Regiment commander Major V.A.Rudakov among the pilots of the 4th squadron of the 67th IAP

Unfortunately, intensive training had a downside: due to the intensification of flights on aircraft with unfinished M-63 engines to the regiment in March 1941, there was a surge in flight accidents. At the request of the division commander, on April 5, Major Ilyin was removed from command, and his deputy, Major Vladimir Afanasyevich Rudakov, became the interim regiment commander.

On April 16, 1941, an incident that was out of the ordinary for the spacecraft air force took place. At about 23:30, when flying on a U-2 plane from the Brienne site to the Bulgarian airfield, Senior Lieutenant A.I. Moklyak lost his bearings, with the aircraft mechanic Petty Officer PD Plisyugin flying as a passenger. The "Travelers", having slipped through the Bulgarian woman in the dark, flew over to the Romanian territory, after which they got lost. During landing, the plane was crashed, but the crew remained unharmed. Two days later, on April 19, Moklyak and Plisyugin safely crossed the border into the territory of the USSR, naturally, leaving the broken U-2 in Romania.

Crash I-16 type 28 of junior lieutenant N.F.Murashev from the 1st squadron, April 12, 1941. Reconstruction of the appearance of the artist Alexander Kazakov

As a result, Major Ilyin was made "extreme", although he had already been appointed inspector for piloting techniques of the Air Force department of the 5th Army, as well as the commander of the 4th squadron, Major I.M. Artamonov (veteran of the war in Spain, 95 sorties, two shot down aircraft). Senior Lieutenant Moklyak from the acting assistant commander of the 4th squadron was demoted to flight commander and came under investigation by the military prosecutor's office.

By June 22, 1941, the 67th IAP approached, to put it mildly, not in the best condition. To ensure the next deployment of the spacecraft air force undertaken at the beginning of the year, a dozen and a half pilots were withdrawn from it, as well as from all other regiments of the district, including the commander of the 2nd squadron, Major P.P. Tikhonov, the piloting technique inspector of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major A D. Yakimenko, navigator of the regiment captain N. L. Dranik and others. Nevertheless, the foundation laid by the previous leadership of the regiment allowed the flight and technical personnel of the 67th IAP to show their best qualities on the first day of the war.

June 22 morning, first clashes

As in all parts of the Red Army Air Force, in the early morning of June 22, 1941, a combat alert was announced in the 67th IAP, the personnel prepared the aircraft for combat missions and scattered them around the airfield.

From left to right: the first commander of the 67th IAP Semyon Grigorievich Ilyin, the regiment commander on June 22, 1941, Vladimir Afanasyevich Rudakov (photo taken later), the chief of staff of the regiment Nikolai Konstantinovich Borisov, Nikolai Moiseevich Ermak

At about 04:00 (hereinafter, Moscow time), a twin-engine aircraft appeared from the east. At first, it was assumed that this was a training alert, and an inspector flew in from the headquarters of the division or the air force of the district. However, the plane turned out to be a Romanian scout. "Blenheim" MK.I (tail number 36) from the 1st reconnaissance and bomber squadron started at 03:30 from the Fokshany-Severny airfield and was supposed to carry out reconnaissance of Soviet airfields in the areas of Chisinau, Bendery, Akkerman, Bolgrad. However, the crew of "Blenheim" squadron commander of the local commander Corneliu Bătăcui (Lt.Cdor.av. Corneliu Bătăcui) was not destined to complete the task.

The fastest responding to the appearance of the Romanian aircraft was the chief of staff of the regiment, Major N. K. Borisov, an experienced pilot who fought on Khalkhin Gol. Seeing the yellow crosses, he ordered Lieutenant N.M. Ermak to destroy the scout. Nikolai Yermak did not disappoint and won the first air victory not only of his regiment and the air force of the Odessa military district, but, apparently, of all the spacecraft air forces in the outbreak of the war.

The only aircraft of the 71st squadron, the flagship Savoy-Marchetti S.79B (tail number 5), which survived the combat sortie on June 22

However, the reconnaissance "Blenheim" was only "the first sign". The direct strikes on the airfields of Bolgrad and Bulgaria were to be carried out by the Romanian air units, which are part of the so-called "Combat Aviation Force" (Gruparea Aeriană de Luptă - GAL), which united the most efficient units.

The first were 12 Savoy-Marchetti S.79В bombers from the 71st and 72nd bomber squadrons, which took off literally 15 minutes after the deceased Blenheim from the Poganele airfield (south of Buzau). To escort them, 18 IAR 80 fighters from the 8th Fighter Air Group were allocated. Due to various reasons, Romanian aircraft entered targets not in a compact group, but in units and even separate aircraft.

Heroes of the morning battle, flight commander of the 4th squadron, senior lieutenant Alexander Ignatievich Moklyak, lieutenant Alexander Alekseevich Melentyev, junior lieutenant Yakov G. Kurochka

The first link of the 71st squadron was led by the commander of the 1st bomber air group, Lokotenent-Commander L. Komsa, who went on a mission on the Savoy with tail number 5 of the squadron commander, Captain K. Stoenescu. Even on the way to the Bulgarian woman at 05: 10–05: 15, the Romanians were attacked by the I-16 troika of the 4th squadron (A. I. Moklyak - A. A. Melent'ev - J. G. Kurochka). As a result of persistent attacks from the rear and front hemispheres, both led Romanian aircraft were shot down. At the same time, the crew of "Savoy" No. 17 died in full force, and from the crew of "Savoy" No. 1, pilot Constantin Bucuri and radio operator Ioan Valku survived, who became the first prisoners of the Romanian aviators in the Great Patriotic War.

The crew of the leading Romanian aircraft did not tempt fate and immediately turned towards the Prut . However, they continued to chase him for another 35 km until he crossed the border. Its Soviet pilots were strictly forbidden to fly, which saved the Romanian flagship with broken tanks, its crew and the commander of the 1st bomber group. According to the results of the battle, Senior Lieutenant Moklyak and Lieutenant Melentyev were rightly counted as one shot down bomber.

The victories of Moklyak and Melentiev were not accidental: both were perfectly trained pilots of not timid dozen. In addition, Moklyak simply needed to distinguish himself in order to make amends for his wrongdoing with the broken U-2. He succeeded - the actions of the link largely predetermined the success of the entire battle that began. Unfortunately, the senior lieutenant had just a few minutes to live.

Immediately after the start of the battle, the Moklyak flight from the airfield began to take off and immediately engage the I-16 flight. Due to the fact that the Romanian aircraft entered the Bulgarian airfield from different directions, the pilots of the 67th IAP had the impression of a thoughtful coordinated strike of several large groups of bombers under the cover of dozens of fighters. This impression was probably reinforced by overflights in the airfield area and by several scouts - three Blenheims and two IAR 39s.

Pilot of the 59th Fighter Squadron Georgy Posteuka in the cockpit of IAR 80

Romanian fighters from the 59th and 60th Fighter Squadrons attempting to defend the Savoy were themselves immediately attacked by Soviet fighters and suffered casualties. The first four IAR 80, led by the commander of the 8th group G. Bordeani and the commander of the 59th fighter squadron, Captain V. Mazaran, were attacked by the I-16 flight of the commander of the 1st squadron, Captain P.F.Golovnev. As a result of the battle, the Romanian pilots hardly managed to fight off the attacks, but one of the IAR 80 slaves was hit, and his pilot G. Posteuca was wounded in the head. He barely brought the fighter to the airfield, where he was able to land normally and was sent to the hospital. Captain Golovnev and one of his wingmen, Lieutenant D. A. Chvatov, were credited with one shot down fighter, declared as "Messerschmitt" Me-109.

Three dozen I-16s participating in the battle literally tore apart the approaching small groups and single planes of the Romanians. Two more Savoyes (# 11 and # 18) from the 72nd Bomber Squadron were damaged, and the pilot of the first of them was wounded.

"Savoy" S.79B (tail number 11) from 72nd Squadron, damaged by fire from fighters of the 67th IAP in a raid on June 22

Romanian intelligence officers suffered even more. Two Blenheims were shot down. The first of them, credited to senior lieutenant A. I. Novitsky, fell 8 kilometers south of Bolgrad. It was an aircraft with a tail number 38 under the control of Captain I. Popescu. The authorship of the victory over the second (tail number 24, pilot adjutant J. Boran) has not been established. Both crews were killed. The third "Blenheim" (tail number 3, pilot adjutant chief F. Paslari) returned to its airfield with significant damage to the fuselage and on one engine.

A pair of light reconnaissance bombers IAR 39 from the 22nd squadron, which took off at 04:00 for reconnaissance along the Matka - Oancha - Cahul - Bolgrad route, was also attacked. As a result, one of them (pilot Adjutant Major Niculescu) was shot down by "donkeys", of the three crew members, only a wounded gunner survived. The second (pilot adjutant chief D. Angelute), after an attack by a pair of I-16s, made an emergency landing on Romanian territory. In this carriage, on the contrary, the shooter was killed, and the pilot and navigator were wounded.

The Romanian fighters from the 60th squadron also did not leave without losses - two IAR 80s were damaged. The pilot of one of them (tail number 56), adjutant G. Sofariu, barely jumping over the border, made an emergency landing on the fuselage in the Briel area. The second (tail number 52) adjutant E. Yupesk managed to reach the airfield in Focsani. One of these two aircraft was credited as an air victory to Senior Lieutenant Ya. I. Rogozin.

IAR-80 (tail number 56) adjutant G. Sofariu from the 60th squadron, who made an emergency landing after a battle with the I-16 of the 67th IAP. Reconstruction by artist Alexei Valyaev-Zaitsev

Despite the losses and the complete absence of victories, the Romanian fighters made an extremely optimistic report, as did the commander of the 1st bomber group, who, based on the results of the flight, announced four victories over Soviet fighters in the air and 33 destroyed I-16s on the ground! The real losses of the 67th IAP were one I-16, in the cockpit of which Senior Lieutenant A. I. Moklyak was killed - he was shot down by the gunner of the S.79В Savoy with tail number 18 that he attacked.

In contrast to the Romanians, the reports on the victories of the 67th IAP look much more moderate: in the combat report of the headquarters of the 21st mixed air division, victories over seven enemy bombers were noted, of which four fell in the Bulgariika-Bolgrad region. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine in detail which of the regiment's pilots shot down or shot down other Romanian aircraft. It can only be noted that one bomber, identified as Xe-111, was personally recorded by senior lieutenants I. M. Ananiev and Ya. I. Rogozin, and the third - to junior lieutenants N. I. Katsapov and G. I. Prokhorov in pairs. Apparently, these pilots attacked single "Savoy", "Blenheim" and IAR 39. In addition, the flight commander Junior Lieutenant MV Bobko declared a victory over the Messerschmitt Me-109.

Summing up the results of repelling the first raid, the command of the 67th IAP could give itself an excellent mark. At the cost of the loss of one I-16 and one pilot, they managed to thwart all the attacks of their airfield, without losing a single car on the ground. The regiment's pilots shot down six aircraft (two Savoy, three Blenheim and one IAR 39) and damaged eight more (three Savoy, three IAR 80, one Blenheim and one IAR 39). At the same time, about 10 Romanian aviators were killed, and several more were injured. This was the best result along the entire length of the Soviet-German front. Nevertheless, the war had just begun, and the enemy was gathering forces for revenge.

Noon. Continuation

The headquarters of the 21st mixed air division, taking into account the forward location of the 67th IAP, instructed the regiment command to "become a shield" for the entire grouping of the 9th Army in the Odessa direction. This was not done in vain, as the Romanians continued to try to carry out their plan.

Aircraft "Potez" P.633 from the 74th squadron, accompanied by He 112 fighters from the 5th fighter air group, about noon on June 22, 1941, heading towards the airfields of Bolgrad and Bulgaria

Nevertheless, the crews of the Romanian reconnaissance missions, who made several additional sorties, finally convinced the command of the seriousness of the intentions of the defenders of the Bulgarian airfield. At about 09:00, they again almost sent to the ground IAR-39 (tail number 84) from the 22nd squadron, the crew of which, with the planes shot through, managed to escape with great difficulty. Therefore, for the next attack, a reinforced detachment was prepared, which included Potez P.633 bombers from the 2nd air group and the PZL P.37 Elk from the 4th air group.

The first to enter the target, at about 12:25 pm, were seven Potezes P.633 from the 74th Bomber Squadron, led by the commander of the 2nd group, Captain I. Cristescu, and the squadron commander, Captain G. Popescu. However, two nines I-16s from the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the 67th IAP, led by captains I.M. Artamonov and F.F. Chechulin, were already waiting for them.

Romanian planes dropped bombs on the Bolgrad airfield under construction, after which they immediately retreated along with 12 Heinkels He 112 escorts. Only two planes fell under the distribution, which bombed the railway station - Soviet fighters managed to intercept and knock out one Potez (tail number 1), the crew of which made an emergency landing in the floodplains. The victory, most likely, was won in a pair of junior lieutenants M.G. Buzhenkov and A.E. Shirmanov.

"Potez" P.633 (tail number 1) from the 74th squadron (pilot adjutant M. Timotin) on an emergency landing among the reeds and duckweed

The most interesting moment concerns the disappearance of the Romanian fighters, thanks to which the 75th Bomber Squadron was defeated in a few minutes. Subsequently, the regiment's political officer, senior political instructor K.N.Myagkov recalled: “When analyzing the battle, we were puzzled by the behavior of the enemy fighters covering the bombers. Noticing Artamonov's nine, they immediately disappeared and did not appear again ... ”.

Separately, it is worth mentioning the "hero of the battle over the Bulgarian woman" Lieutenant Theodore Mosca from the 51st Fighter Squadron. To this day, only the lazy has not described his "exploits", embodied in two shot down I-16s. It goes without saying that the He 112 pilots did not fight over the Bulgarian woman, they had no losses or victories, and Moscu was not even part of this group. He flew an hour later as part of the eight to escort the IAR 37 aircraft from the 18th squadron and participated in the battle over Izmail against the I-153 and I-15bis from the 96th OIAE of the Air Force of the Danube Flotilla.

While the Soviet pilots tried to attack the 7th squadron of the 74th squadron, two units of the 75th squadron managed to reach the Bulgarian airfield and bomb themselves, and the first unit, led by the squadron commander captain N. Balsha, first slipped through the airfield , and all three crews had to make a second run. Actually, this predetermined the defeat of the entire group. Almost immediately, the squadron's planes were attacked by Captain Chechulin's nine.

The commander of the 2nd group I. Cristescu at his plane

The first link, which was the last to leave the airfield, suffered the most. The leader's plane was shot down, both wingmen (aircraft with tail # 4 and # 13) were seriously damaged, and the first of them was completely destroyed on landing. In the second flight, the right wingman Potez was shot down (tail number 20, pilot S. Krakun), whose crew was killed. The left wingman (aircraft No. 17) was damaged, and only the lead aircraft of the flight returned to the base unharmed, apparently because it was the very first to leave the Bulgarian woman.

The outcome of the battle in Soviet sources corresponds exactly to the Romanian data: “According to the report of Artamonov and Chechulin, four Junkers caught fire and with difficulty crossed the front line. They were wounded - the result of firing from long distances ... ".In this battle, the deputy commander of the 3rd squadron, Captain S.I. Andreev, distinguished himself, who was credited with two personally shot down aircraft and one more in tandem with Junior Lieutenant F.I. Lisitsyn.

According to the plans of the Romanian command, the crews of the 4th Bomber Air Group under the cover of the Hurricanes from the 53rd Fighter Squadron were instructed to "complete the rout" of the airfields in the Bolgrad-Bulgarianka area. This group appeared over the Bulgarian woman at 13:30.

These pilots acted most professionally. The commander of the 76th squadron, Captain A. Stefanesku, and his wingmen managed to hold the formation and drop bombs on the airfield. According to their report, Soviet fighters allegedly began attacking 5 minutes before the target, after crossing the border near the town of Măcin. The interaction of Romanian bombers and escort fighters was organized at the proper level, and as a result, the six Hurricanes managed to tie up most of the I-16s in battle. Nevertheless, only one "Los" (tail number 210, pilot I. Kuluri) returned from the last flight of the 77th squadron from this flight, the crew of which was counted as a consolation by the shot down I-16.

PZL P.37 "Elk" takes off with tail number 210

Undoubtedly, the heroes of this flight were the crews of the six "Hurricanes" (leading lokotenent L. Toma, led adjutants P. Cordescu, E. Kamenzeani, K. Popescu, K. Pomut, N. Kulzer). They failed to protect all the planes of the strike group, but they fought desperately and were able to inflict losses on the Soviet "colleagues" - two victories were declared by adjutants Cordescu and Pomut. The Soviet side admits losses in this battle - two I-16s were destroyed. Their pilots, Acting Deputy Regiment Commander Captain V.S.Nikiforov and Lieutenant I.F.Solganov, were wounded. Two days later, on June 24, Lieutenant Solganov died in the hospital.

However, the actual results of the bombing strike are not at all impressive. Even the Romanian crews themselves declared only six aircraft destroyed on the ground, but in reality the losses of the 67th IAP were even less. According to the regiment's documents, in just two raids, losses on the ground amounted to two I-16s, which received fragmentation and bullet holes. Another plane scooped up during takeoff due to falling into a poorly rolled bomb crater. Pilot Lieutenant Leontyev remained unharmed, the plane was broken. With all due respect to the crews of the Elks, it is more likely that the aircraft on the ground were damaged as a result of the strike of the Potez group of the 75th squadron.

PZL P.37 "Los", tactical number 206, from the 77th bomber squadron, shot down in an air battle on June 22, 1941 over the Bulgarian airfield (artist Alexey Valyaev-Zaitsev)

The claims for victories for the pilots of the 1st and 4th squadrons of the 67th IAP and the actual number of downed bombers in this episode coincide by almost 100%. Victories were declared by Lieutenant N.M. Ermak (personally), as well as junior lieutenants Ya. G. Kurochka and V.P. Khudoleev (in pairs).

At the same time, Lieutenant Yermak's second victory in a day is no less remarkable than the first. Here is what follows from the report of the senior engineer of the 21st mixed air division: "06/22/1941 Lieutenant Ermak, gaining height above the five bombers, began to hit their RS, as a result of which the aircraft violated their formation ...". This is the first documented case of the use of rockets in the Great Patriotic War. Apparently, because of the explosions of rockets, the Romanians considered that their "Losi" No. 206 (adjutant K. Vyrlan) and No. 214 (adjutant V. Nenescu) were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire.

"Hurricane" Mk.I from the 53rd Fighter Squadron, pilot - adjutant Konstantin Pomut (artist Igor Zlobin)

The further fate of Lieutenant Yermak was thorny, as was the history of the entire 67th IAP. On the morning of the second day of the war, he was shot down in an air battle, wounded, but managed to leave the uncontrollable I-16 with a parachute. After being wounded in the 67th IAP, Ermak did not return, but was transferred to the 149th IAP. On July 1, 1942, he was shot down over enemy territory and was captured on July 16, from which he fled on July 27, after which he was in the occupied territory until January 1943. Since February 1943, after passing the check, he served as a squadron adjutant in the 239th IAP. Nevertheless, Nikolai Moiseevich was still able to fight, and in January 1945 he again ascended into the sky. As part of the 181st Guards IAP, being an ordinary pilot, he personally shot down 4 enemy aircraft, thus becoming an ace. For this, the pilot, in addition to the Order of Lenin for the first battles, was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner, and by May 1945 he had risen to the rank of squadron commander, receiving the rank of captain. He was transferred to the reserve in the fall of 1948, died on November 13, 1967.

Results and conclusions

The attack by bombers of the 4th bomber group ended the raids of the Romanian aviation on the airfields of the 67th IAP. After 14:00, the Romanian aviation did not take any action, except for reconnaissance flights. During one of these sorties, the Blenheim (tail number 22) from the 1st squadron was hit, but its crew managed to reach their airfield.

The Romanians not only failed to destroy the Soviet Air Force in their area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility or force them to retreat from forward airfields, but even inflict any serious damage. Actually, the Romanians had completed only 56 sorties by bombers by 14:00, of which 18 were at airfields in the Chisinau and Tiraspol regions, 30 at Bolgrad and Bulgarians, and 8 at Izmail.

War was war, but lunch was brought to the Bulgarian airfield

In this situation, hoping to gain air supremacy was, to say the least, naive. Most of the Soviet aviation units in the Odessa direction did not participate in hostilities at all on June 22, and the personnel did not see a single Romanian aircraft in the sky. In fact, the entire offensive impulse of the Romanians was extinguished by a single fighter regiment, and there were six more such units in the OdVO Air Force, and all of them, including the 55th IAP, which fell under the German "press", remained in a combat-ready state. The tasks of destroying the Soviet Air Force at airfields and gaining air supremacy were postponed by the Romanian command to the following days.

The brilliant actions of the 67th IAP are knocked out of the entire range of units of the spacecraft air force along the entire front. What is the secret of the regiment's success, which actually defeated the Romanian "Combat Air Force" on the first day of the war? There are many reasons for this.

First, success was largely due to the decisiveness and common sense of the regiment's command. While most of the Soviet fighter regiments, following the installation of directive number 1, "wagged their wings to German aircraft," Major Borisov, the chief of staff of the 67th IAP, without hesitation, gave the order to shoot down an enemy aircraft that appeared in the airfield area. Immediately after that, not yet having any instructions from above, the regiment's command organized patrols over the airfield, and the personnel were ready to destroy the enemy, and not "force them to land" or "force them out abroad." But the directive number 2, allowing active hostilities, was received at the headquarters of the ODVO only at 09:15 !!!

A group of pilots of the 67th IAP near the plane of the commander of the 4th squadron, Captain Savenko

Secondly, the main guarantee of success was the plan of the chief of the operational department of the regiment, Major Kostikov, who assumed, in the event of an enemy attack on the airfield, to counteract large groups of fighters, which replaced each other as fuel was consumed. It would seem that nothing outstanding, but even in the case when the planes of the Romanian 4th group managed to keep the formation and break through to the airfield, it was due to the numerical superiority that the Soviet pilots managed to disrupt the aimed bombing and shoot down two bombers.

Thirdly, at a critical moment, experienced commanders and pilots of the regiment brilliantly showed their leadership qualities, who bore the brunt of the battles and were able to captivate the rest of the personnel. This happened both in the case of the decisiveness of Lieutenant Yermak, and during the attacks of Senior Lieutenant Moklyak and Lieutenant Melentiev on the link "Savoy", and in the subsequent episode, when Captain Golovnev's link literally tore apart the patrol of the commander of the 8th fighter air group of the Romanians. In battles at 12:30 and 13:30, the leading captains Artamonov, Chechulin, Andreev showed themselves perfectly.

In just a day, the regiment's pilots shot down at least 11 Romanian aircraft: three Potez, two Elk, two Savoy, three Blenheim and one IAR 39. In addition, at least 12 more aircraft were damaged of varying severity: two Savoy, two Blenheim, three IAR 80, three Potez and two IAR 39. Of these, one Potez and one IAR 39 were crashed in forced landings.

The I-16s of the 67th IAP in the summer of 1941 had a numerical designation system - large tactical numbers were applied with white paint to the tail unit of the aircraft:
1st Squadron: aircraft numbers 10 to 29;
2nd Squadron: aircraft numbers 30 to 49;
3rd Squadron: aircraft numbers 50 to 69;
4th Squadron: aircraft numbers 70 to 89.
There is no exact information on the numbers of the control unit of the regiment - apparently, these are numbers from 1 to 9 or from 90 to 100.
Presented profile I-16 type 24 - reconstruction from the picture above, artist Alexander Kazakov

In the final operational summary of the 67th IAP, it was quite authentically noted that during the day the pilots of the regiment made 177 sorties and shot down 18 enemy aircraft, of which 16 bombers and two fighters. For this, the regiment received an absolutely deserved congratulatory telegram from the 9th Army Air Force commander, General Michugin.

It should be noted that in the future, the regiment's command continued to conduct hostilities clearly, competently and without unnecessary fuss, and, despite the almost daily attempts of the Romanian aviation to destroy the regiment's aircraft, the 67th IAP continued basing at the Bolgrad air hub until July 19. Having dispersed the squadrons across the field sites, the regiment suffered minimal losses: on July 19, it included 40 serviceable and 10 defective I-16s.

Pilots of the 67th IAP, distinguished themselves on June 22, 1941. From left to right, from top to bottom: Pavel Fedorovich Golovnev, Yakov Ivanovich Rogozin, Alexey Pavlovich Novitsky, Ivan Matveyevich Ananyev, Ivan Mikhailovich Artamonov, Fedor Fedorovich Chechulin, Andreev Samson Ivanovich, Lisitsyn Fedor Ivanovich

In total, from June 22 to September 20, 1941, the personnel of the 67th IAP performed 3360 sorties, shooting down 79 enemy aircraft. For outstanding services, the regiment was presented to the Order of Lenin, and the commander and commissar of the regiment - to the Orders of the Red Banner and promotion in military ranks. But, apparently, old sins were recalled, the regiment did not wait for the award. True, the 67th IAP nevertheless received its small share of fame: in mid-July 1941, an episode about the life of the regiment at the Bulgarian airfield was filmed for the collection "Soyuzkinozhurnal". Due to the fact that at that moment only the 4th squadron was based there, in the chronicle this video was called “Squadron comrade. Savenko "...

Photos and recollections of the 67th IAP personnel were provided by the granddaughter of A.A. Melentieva Inna Kravchenko and grandson N.D. Solokhin by Mikhail Solokhin. Romanian data are cited from the book of Romanian historians Dan Antoniu and George Cicosha "Aviation of Romania in the aggression on June 22, 1941".